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ABSTRACT 
 
Austin Yost: Exposiciones Soviéticas: Selling Socialist Modernity in the US’s Backyard 
(Under the direction of Donald Raleigh) 
 
 
In this paper, I discuss these Soviet Exhibitions of Science, Technology, and Culture 
hosted in Mexico City in 1959, Havana in 1960, and Rio de Janeiro in 1962, which served as part 
of a larger project to familiarize Latin Americans with Soviet culture and achievements. With 
this “cultural offensive,” as contemporary American observers characterized it, the USSR hoped 
to attract the attention of “ordinary people.” With their low ticket prices and timely displays–
which included the Lunik and Sputnik spacecraft–these exhibitions drew in millions of visitors. 
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Introduction 
 
On the afternoon of May 3, 1962, the opening day of the Soviet Exhibition of Science, 
Technology, and Culture in Rio de Janeiro, tens of thousands of people gathered in front of the 
Palácio de São Cristóvão. In spite of rain, they stood patiently in line waiting for the grand 
opening. Looking out on a multicolored sea of umbrellas, the event’s organizers compared the 
crowd to a huge flower garden. Hours passed in anticipation. Finally, that evening the exhibition 
opened for visitors, and the building that normally housed the National Museum of Brazil could 
not accommodate all those who wished to see “the Soviet Union in miniature.”1 After closing in 
early June, official Soviet estimates counted a total of over half a million visitors to the 
exhibition.2 
Why did an event like this, sponsored by the Soviet Union, draw such massive crowds in 
a country where the Brazilian Communist Party had been declared illegal? For decades, fears of 
leftist subversion had motivated drastic purges of municipal legislatures and mass evictions of 
urban slum communities “infiltrated” by communist activist organizations in Brazil, yet now the 
Brazilian government invited the USSR to set up a massive display in the traditionally working-
class neighborhood of Imperial de São Cristóvão.3 This was not the first major Soviet exhibition 
in Latin America either; the Cuban government’s recent shift toward radical Marxism had taken 
place immediately after a similar exhibition in Havana in 1960, which arrived there after a stop 
                                                          
1 V. Borisov, “Brazilsko-Sovetskaia druzhba budet eshche krepche,” Sovetskaia Estoniia, 7 Sept. 1962. 
 
2 “Ikh bylo polmilliona,” Izvestiia, 3 June 1962. 
 
3 Brodwyn Fischer, “The Red Menace Reconsidered: A Forgotten History of Communist Mobilization in Rio de 
Janeiro’s Favelas, 1945-1964,” Hispanic American Historical Review 94 (2014): 1–33. 
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in Mexico City the previous year. Why did these events appeal to broad audiences of both Latin 
American leaders and ordinary citizens at the height of the Cold War? 
In this paper, I discuss these Soviet Exhibitions of Science, Technology, and Culture 
hosted in Mexico City in 1959, Havana in 1960, and Rio de Janeiro in 1962, which served as part 
of a larger project to familiarize Latin Americans with Soviet culture and achievements. Other 
salient aspects of this “cultural offensive,”4 as contemporary American observers characterized 
it, included Latin American tours by Soviet musicians and theatre troupes as well as exchanges 
of parliamentary delegations. Such high-brow efforts catered to Latin American elites and 
politicians, while the organizers of these exhibitions primarily hoped to attract the attention of 
“ordinary people.”5 With their low ticket prices and timely displays–which included the Lunik 
and Sputnik spacecraft–these exhibitions drew in millions of visitors.6  
Scholars often frame Soviet diplomatic outreach to developing nations within an assumed 
struggle to maintain the USSR’s position as the leader of world revolution. This model assumes 
that competition with China for influence over Third World revolutionary movements motivated 
Soviet leaders to look beyond the Cold War conflict with the West and pay attention to the 
emerging Global South.7 These exhibitions, however, constituted a major effort to bridge the 
Second and Third worlds that did not cater to local radicals. Instead, Soviet officials wished to 
appeal to a broad audience and strengthen cultural, economic, and diplomatic exchange by 
presenting the USSR as a friendly developed nation intent on building mutually beneficial 
                                                          
4 Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). 
 
5 G. Borovik, “Meksikantsy: ‘Rusia [sic] - khorosho!’” Ogonek, no. 49, 1959, 2-3. 
 
6 Tobias Rupprecht, “Soviet Internationalism after Stalin: The USSR and Latin America in the Cultural Cold War” 
(PhD diss., European University Institute, 2012), 69-72. 
 
7 Ilya Prizel, Latin America through Soviet Eyes: The Evolution of Soviet Perceptions during the Brezhnev Era, 
1964-1982 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 5. 
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relationships with Latin American states.8 Tellingly, the exhibitions lacked displays that 
emphasized either Marxist-Leninist class struggle or direct confrontation with the West. Rather 
than highlight the Soviet Union’s revolutionary heritage, these exhibitions sought to affirm that 
Soviet prosperity was an achievable goal that other nations could reach without resorting to 
violent class struggle.9 Notions of social justice and economic equality permeated many of the 
displays, presented in terms of measurable, practical benefits enjoyed by the USSR’s citizens.   
In this paper, I seek to analyze how the USSR marketed its society and its successes to a 
region that Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin (1922-52) once labelled “a collection of US 
satellites.”10 Most countries in Latin America had little contact with the USSR before the late 
1950s. Yet by the early 1960s the threat of Soviet influence in that region caused President John 
F. Kennedy (1961-63) to label it “the most dangerous area in the world.”11 The broader “cultural 
offensive” in Latin America attempted to portray the USSR as an attractive trading partner and a 
potentially valuable ally to these nations. I argue that these exhibitions, as part of this effort, 
intended to “normalize” the USSR in the minds of visitors–to make the Soviet Union seem 
inviting, unthreatening, and friendly–while simultaneously drawing attention to the exceptional 
achievements of Soviet science and industry. More broadly, my close study of these exhibitions 
reveals much about how the USSR wished to be perceived by the Third World during this 
period. How did the USSR, in a region of the world subjected to decades of US influence and 
anti-Soviet propaganda, attempt to rebrand itself as a modern state, a valuable trading partner, 
                                                          
8 Anastas Mikoian, “My za torgovliu, ravnopravnuiu i vzaimovygonuiu!” Pravda, 30 Nov. 1959. 
 
9 S. A. Borisov, “Sovetskii Soiuz i Meksiko,” Novoe Vremia, no. 50, 1959, 16-17. 
 
10 Quoted in: Prizel, Latin America through Soviet Eyes, 1. 
 
11 Quoted in: Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist 
Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 7. 
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and a potential ally? In order to better understand the cultural dimension of Soviet foreign policy 
in the postwar period, I turn my attention here to Soviet cultural diplomacy in Latin America. 
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Historiography and Methodology 
 
Although a substantial body of scholarship documents the United States’ role in 
promoting its own model of capitalist modernization to the developing world, including Latin 
America,12 only recently have scholars begun to tease out the Soviet influences on Latin 
American state-building and economic development.13 After the fall of the USSR, the majority 
of scholarship on Cold War culture emphasized the role of American “soft power” 14 in 
accelerating the Soviet collapse. During this period, economics and culture were fundamentally 
intertwined in propaganda that advertised how the Soviet Union or United States achieved higher 
standards of living that allowed their citizens to lead better, more fulfilling lives.15 Continued 
focus on the West and its apparent victory in the cultural Cold War generated valuable 
scholarship on American cultural diplomacy,16 but its Soviet equivalent remained largely 
                                                          
12 Michael Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America's Civilizing Mission (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006); Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in 
Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and 
World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
 
13 Tobias Rupprecht, “Socialist High Modernity and Global Stagnation: A Shared History of Brazil and the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War,” Journal of Global History 6 (2011): 505-28. Jacqueline Loss, Dreaming in Russian: 
The Cuban Soviet Imaginary (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013); João Gonçalves, “Sputnik Premiers in 
Havana: A Historical Ethnography of the 1960 Soviet Exposition,” in The Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders in the 
Second World, ed. Ann Gorsuch and Diane Koenker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013). 
 
14 Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 616 (2008): 94-109. 
 
15 Susan E. Reid, “Who Will Beat Whom: Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition in 
Moscow, 1959,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 9 (Fall 2008): 855-904. 
 
16 See Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003); Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the 
Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1998); Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and the United States 
Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). 
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unexamined. Despite the appearance of new scholarship on the Soviet experience that has 
complicated this one-sided narrative, Khrushchev-era efforts to reshape the USSR’s public image 
in the Third World remain understudied. At the time, these activities caused a great stir among 
Western observers, who noted that the Soviet Union’s rhetoric of peaceful coexistence, national 
sovereignty, and state-driven industrialization greatly appealed to developing countries.17 Yet 
these public diplomacy campaigns have received scarce attention in academic literature.  
By using press sources from Latin America, the US, and the USSR, I attempt to 
reconstruct the Soviet Exhibitions of Science, Technology and Culture and to account for the 
primary themes of their displays. Between 1959 and 1962 the Soviet media greatly increased its 
coverage of Latin American affairs. From 1917 to 1958, an average of 91 articles on Latin 
America in Soviet papers appeared per year; yet; in the three years between the Mexico City and 
Rio de Janeiro exhibitions, the Soviet press published an average of 810 titles per year.18 The 
Soviet press cited positive visitor responses in guestbooks and conversations with guides as 
proof that the exhibitions had garnered a positive reception. In addition to coverage in 
newspapers, articles on the exhibitions appeared in the Soviet monthlies Promyslovaia 
kooperatsiia (Trade Cooperation), Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’ (International Life) and Vneshniaia 
torgovlia (Foreign Trade) and in the popular magazine Ogonek (Flame). The journal Novoe 
vremia (New Times), which was published in Spanish, Portuguese and English as well as in 
Russian, likely aimed to entice an international audience with its favorable coverage of these 
showcases. Even though many of the articles published in the Soviet press contained more 
internationalist rhetoric and exhortations against imperialism than details about the exhibitions, 
                                                          
17 Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Foreign Propaganda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964). 
 
18 Lev Okinshevych, Latin America in Soviet Writings: A Bibliography, ed. Robert G. Carlton (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins Press, 1966), v. 
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by reading them we can still learn how the USSR wanted these events to be understood. What 
kind of responses from Latin American visitors did the Soviet Union hope to provoke? What 
reactions were “correct” and therefore fit for publication in the Soviet press?  
I also consider coverage of these exhibitions in several major Spanish-language 
periodicals published in Mexico and Cuba. These include the Mexican papers Excélsior, Siempre 
(Always), and El Siglo de Torreon (The Century of Torreon) as well as the Cuban periodicals 
Bohemia and INRA and the Cuban newspaper Noticias de Hoy (News of the Day).  While the 
political leanings of these publications range from the center-right perspective of Excélsior to the 
far left leanings of INRA, all of these sources present a positive image of the exhibitions and their 
reception by Latin American audiences. While my lack of facility in Portuguese prevents me 
from consulting Brazilian press sources, I nonetheless consider the Rio de Janeiro exhibition in 
this paper because it was the largest Soviet exhibition ever held in a foreign country and received 
substantial coverage in the Soviet press. In many ways, the Rio exhibition represented the 
capstone of the Soviet cultural offensive in Latin America.  
In addition, I examine discussions of the exhibitions in major American and Spanish 
newspapers. Both Spain and the US paid special attention to Soviet cultural penetration of Latin 
America, given their strong ties to the region. These sources often highlight public outcry against 
the exhibitions, and can help us understand aspects of the Latin American reception of these 
exhibitions that the Soviet press deliberately ignored or downplayed. 
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Historical Background 
 
In 1956 at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev 
articulated his policy of “peaceful coexistence” that became “a fundamental principle of Soviet 
foreign policy.”19 Khrushchev trusted that the innate superiority of the socialist system ensured 
the USSR’s success in the Cold War. During the late 1950s, he began formulating a new party 
program, formally adopted at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 
1961, which promised that the USSR would overtake the US in per capita production by 1970 
and achieve full communism in 1980. Such heady optimism did not seem wholly unfounded, 
given the rapid rise of the Soviet GDP and living standards during the 1950s. As Argentinian 
economist Sergio Bagú noted, the Soviet economy was growing faster than its American 
counterpart at the time.20  
Khrushchev believed that other nations could follow the Soviet example without 
undergoing violent revolutions. This meant that foreign governments could now be trusted to 
bring their countries closer to the Soviet model without the intervention of either local 
communists or the Red Army. Developments within Soviet academia also helped bring about 
this change. New cadres trained in the developing field of “international relations” promoted an 
understanding of geopolitics based on the actions of independent states rather than the interests 
                                                          
19 Nikita Khrushchev, quoted in Current Soviet Policies II: The Documentary Record of the Twentieth Party 
Congress and Its Aftermath, ed. Leo Gruliow (New York: Praeger, 1957), 36-37. 
 
20 Sergio Bagú, Argentina en el Mundo (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1961), 153-55. 
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of opposing classes.21 The official Soviet discourse fit the developing nations into its policy of 
peaceful coexistence by calling them, along with the socialist states, a worldwide “peace zone.”22 
The Soviet media began to portray the USSR’s diplomatic efforts in the developing nations as a 
means of integrating the Second and Third worlds, since both shared a common commitment to 
peace. Western scholars noted that this inclusive rhetoric of world peace possessed broad 
appeal,23 and, as will be shown, this theme featured heavily in the Soviet exhibitions in Latin 
America.  
At the same time, however, the USSR’s perception of its relationship with the Third 
World drew heavily upon its experience developing its own non-European republics. The Soviet 
press, as well as public statements by Soviet officials addressed to Latin American audiences, 
frequently compared the developing world to Soviet Central Asia and Caucasia prior to the 
October Revolution. When explaining to a Cuban journalist his decision to send his First Deputy 
Prime Minister Anastas Mikoian to Latin America as the USSR’s representative at the Mexican 
and Cuban exhibitions, Khrushchev pointed out that Armenian-born Mikoian had firsthand 
experience in the modernization of the Caucasus.24 In a printed address distributed to visitors to 
the exhibition in Rio de Janeiro, Khrushchev boasted that, thanks to rapid modernization under 
the Soviet leadership, “the formerly backward borderlands of tsarist Russia–such as Uzbekistan, 
Azerbaijan, and Armenia–became flowering republics, culturally and economically surpassing 
                                                          
21 William Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-1967 (Princeton: Princeton Univeristy 
Press, 1973), 26-41. 
 
22 Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry, eds, Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World (New 
York: Praeger, 1975), 30. 
 
23 Barghoorn, Soviet Foreign Propaganda, 30. 
 
24 Aleksandr Fursenko, ed. Prezidium TsK KPSS: 1954-1964 (Moscow: Rossiiskaia Politicheskaia Entsiklopediia, 
2003), 884-903. 
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many highly developed capitalist countries.”25 By implication, just as Soviet rule had created 
“flowering republics” in its own backward regions, so too could the Soviet example inspire 
similar change in Latin America.  The odd dissonance between the Soviet rhetoric of peaceful 
coexistence, which stressed that the USSR treated all sovereign nations as equals and rejected the 
colonial biases of the West, and these discursive vestiges of European paternalism characterized 
Soviet cultural diplomacy in this period.  
During the 1950s, developments in Latin American politics also fostered hopes of closer 
relations with the Soviet Union. In 1954, the US helped to overthrow the democratically elected 
government of President Jacobo Árbenz (1951-54) in Guatemala and imposed a rightwing 
dictatorship in its place. Afterward, the US’s public image in the region sank quickly. Many 
Latin American progressives began promoting new theories of “developmentalism,” which 
maintained that economic dependence on the US had caused Latin America’s backwardness.26 
As more and more Latin American nations worked to develop stronger business ties with 
Western Europe and Japan, some also considered the socialist nations as potential trade partners. 
It was during this same period that Khrushchev began promoting the USSR’s foreign trade, and 
Mikoian stated that any nation that desired an exhibition of Soviet products “could get it for the 
asking.”27  
Leftist, but not Marxist, governments ran the host countries that invited the three Soviet 
exhibitions. Both Mexican President Adolfo López Mateos (1958-64) and Brazilian President 
João Goulart (1961-64) viewed closer ties with the USSR as a means of putting pressure on the 
                                                          
25 Nikita Khrushchev, “Poslanie Predsedatelia Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. Khrushcheva,” Vneshniaia torgovlia, 
no. 4, 1962, 3-5. 
 
26 Discussed in Ramon Grosfoguel, “Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America,” 
Nepantla: Views from South 1, 2000: 347-74. 
 
27 “A. I. Mikoian v Meksike,” Izvestiia, 31 Nov. 1959. 
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US, in the hope of receiving fairer treatment in future negotiations with the US. Novoe vremia 
republished a statement from the president of Brazil’s Supreme Council of Producers Velasquez 
Vargas declaring that, despite US warnings that commerce with the USSR would lead to 
“communist penetration” and “threaten Brazil’s national security,” “a great many countries 
maintain trade and diplomatic relations with the USSR and I do not see why Brazil should not do 
so too.”28 As a Brazilian economist noted in 1958, “as red as the Russians may be, they will 
never change the black color of the raw oil that they sell us or the green color of the coffee beans 
that they buy from us.”29 The fledgling government of Cuba pursued similar ambitions. After the 
Cuban Revolution ended in early 1959, the new government attempted to renegotiate the terms 
of the island’s sugar trade. Soviet aid and arms could provide much needed insurance in case the 
US refused to renegotiate and instead tried to crush the new Cuban government.30 
In the following sections, I explicate how these exhibitions, merging both newer 
Khrushchev-era aspects of Soviet society such as an emphasis on socialist consumerism and the 
space program along with more traditional Soviet themes dating back to the time of Lenin and 
Stalin, worked to entice Latin American audiences. Given that all three exhibitions contained 
many similar displays and reflected the same contemporary Soviet self-image, these segments 
are divided thematically. The first provides an introduction by describing which government 
organs organized the exhibitions, basic facts such as attendance figures, dates, and location, as 
well as the experience of some of the Soviet personnel who were sent abroad to facilitate these 
events.  The next three parts describe the displays at the exhibitions in more detail and look at the 
response they provoked in the Latin American press. These are divided according to the three 
                                                          
28 M. Kremnev, “Braziliia smotrit na vostok,” Novoe vremia, no. 46 1959: 16-17. 
 
29 Quoted in Rupprecht, “Socialist High Modernity and Global Stagnation,” 513. 
 
30 Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 1262-266. 
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major ideas that stand out as the primary arguments for Soviet superiority made by the 
exhibitions. In order, they cover: Soviet claims to extraordinary scientific and technical 
achievement, followed by consumer-oriented displays that aimed to make everyday life in the 
USSR seem appealing, and finally examples of more traditional cultural display such as the fine 
arts as well as musical and theatrical performances. 
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Exhibition Basics 
 
The Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry that put together all three of these exhibitions had 
organized over eighty international exhibitions and fairs in sixteen countries during the interwar 
years, as well as an additional sixty-eight exhibitions in twenty-two countries in the first ten 
years after World War II.31 But before 1959 it sponsored only one major event in Latin America, 
a trade fair in Buenos Aires, the capital of Argentina, in 1955, which drew 2.3 million visitors 
over forty days.32 Originally intended to appeal to potential business partners, the fair lacked 
displays covering Soviet cultural topics. Instead, visitors could examine and purchase Soviet 
harvesting machines, trucks, coal steam cutters, and portable oil well drilling equipment. In 
response to this resounding Soviet success, the US deployed a new exhibition, “People’s 
Capitalism,” using Soviet-style rhetoric in the exhibition’s title.33 This exhibition opened in 
Mexico, Columbia, Guatemala, Chile, and Bolivia in 1956, but did not receive nearly as many 
visitors as the Soviet trade fair in Buenos Aires.34 
With the Soviet Exhibitions of Science, Technology, and Culture in Mexico, Cuba, and 
Brazil, the Foreign Trade Ministry attempted to duplicate this earlier success. Drawing upon 
contemporary trends of socialist consumerism and scientific achievement, as well as more 
                                                          
31 Mikhail Nestorov, Uchastie Sovetskogo Soiuza v mezhdunarodnykh iarmarkakh i vystavkakh (Moscow: 
Vneshtorgizdat, 1957). 
 
32 Ivan Bol’shakov, “Uspekh Sovetskikh vystakov v stranakh Latinskoi Ameriki” in Na vsekh kontinentakh mira, ed. 
Ivan Bol’shakov (Moscow: Pravda, 1962), 87-100. 
 
33 Rupprecht, “Soviet Internationalism after Stalin,” 304. 
 
34 Laura Belmonte, Selling the American Way: US Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 133. 
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traditional forms of cultural display through art and performance, these exhibitions intended to 
appeal to a broad audience of Latin American “political leaders, important businessmen and 
ordinary people.”35 Each of the exhibitions attracted large numbers of visitors. In Mexico City, a 
total of over one million people attended the Soviet Exhibition of Science, Technology, and 
Culture–more than any other exhibition in Mexican history.36 The Havana exhibition attracted 
between 800,000 to a million visitors, one eighth of the total Cuban population and a greater 
turnout than for Carnival.37 The numbers for the Rio de Janeiro exhibition amounted to around 
half a million, although unofficially the exhibition staff claimed closer to a million.38 
Major reorganizations of Soviet public diplomacy organs as well as an expansion of the 
Soviet foreign language press set the stage for this new cultural offensive. Two Soviet agencies 
bore responsibility for this shift. In 1958, the All-Union Organization for Cultural Contacts, or 
VOKS, was reorganized and renamed the Union of Societies for Friendship, the SSOD, with 
Armenian composer Aram Khachaturian as president of its Latin American subdivision. While 
the VOKS had only one combined department for the United States and Latin America, the 
SSOD quickly developed a refined regional differentiation. Furthermore, the selection of 
Khachaturian as a figurehead for the organization made perfect sense within the logic of the new 
Soviet cultural diplomacy. A renowned composer, Khachaturian’s visits delighted cultured Latin 
American audiences. And as an Armenian, Khachaturian presented a firsthand success story of 
socialist modernization within the non-European Soviet republics. In his first speech as president 
of the association, for instance, he reiterated the USSR’s commitment to dealing with the Latin 
                                                          
35 Borovik, “Meksikantsy: ‘Rusia [sic] - khorosho!’” 2. 
 
36 V. Kozyreva, “V gostiakh u Meksikantsev,” Promyslovaia kooperatsiia, no. 4, 1960: 26. 
 
37 Bol’shakov, “Uspekh Sovetskikh vystakov v stranakh Latinskoi Ameriki,” 93. 
 
38 Borisov, “Brazilsko-Sovetskaia druzhba budet eshche krepche.” 
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American countries as equals, and not exotic dependencies of a rival superpower. “Never will the 
tropical exoticism, palms and orchids, parrots and alligators keep us from acknowledging the 
pride of the Latin American peoples, their diligence, their fight, their history, culture, their 
pursuits and dreams.”39 The State Committee for Cultural Relations, or GKKS, constituted the 
other major coordinating agency for Soviet cultural diplomacy. Founded in 1957, GKKS 
supervised the translation of Soviet literature into foreign languages and the formulation of 
Soviet print media for foreign consumption. As a result of Soviet media reforms in the mid-
1950s, these international efforts aimed to represent a newer, more colorful vision of Soviet 
society. In regular evaluations, the Cultural Department of the Central Committee usually 
commended the editors, but suggested that the journals address a broader, not only communist, 
readership by adapting to local customs. This meant the “frequent use of terms such as election, 
decision, and resolution” as well as “more humor and modern language.”40 The GKKS and 
SSOD participated heavily in the planning of the Exhibitions of Science, Culture, and 
Technology, and the GKKS provided translators to the exhibitions as well.  
The Mexico City and Havana exhibitions were heavily modified versions of a Soviet 
National Exhibition that took place at the New York Coliseum in the summer of 1959.41 New 
displays added after the New York exhibition included various agricultural machinery, 
photographic equipment and television sets.42 Aleksander Shelnov, an economist from the 
Foreign Trade Ministry, served as the official director of both exhibitions. The Mexican 
exhibition was staged in the National Auditorium, an ultramodern structure situated near one of 
                                                          
39 Vladimir Pechatnov, “Exercise in Frustration: Soviet Foreign Propaganda in the Early Cold War,” Cold War 
History 1 (2000/01): 16. 
 
40 Rupprecht, “Soviet Internationalism after Stalin,” 59. 
 
41 Borisov, “Sovetskii Soiuz i Meksiko.”  
 
42   “Exposicion,” Bohemia, 14 Feb. 1960: 12. 
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Mexico City’s wealthiest districts on the edge of Chapúltepec Park, the largest city park in Latin 
America. An enormous red banner advertising the USSR wrapped around the auditorium, 
accompanied by flags of the fifteen Soviet republics linked with the Mexican flag. The 
exhibition opened on November 21, 1959, and closed on December 15. Within 8,000 square 
meters, a space much smaller than the New York Coliseum, the exhibition housed 16,000 display 
units divided into 12 major sections, such as Lunik-Sputnik, Nuclear Energy in the Service of 
Peace, and The Well-Being of the Soviet Man.43  
The exhibition’s organizers hired local residents to attach stickers, guerilla marketing 
style, to trams and buses in order to spread excitement about the event. A quarter-page 
advertisement in Excélsior, part of a series of ads leading up to the opening of the exhibit, 
announced “Luniks and Sputniks in Chapúltepec!” and promised visitors a front-row seat to the 
Soviet rockets that were “discovering the secrets of the cosmos” along with other scientific 
advances, including atomic reactors and ultrasound machines. The exhibition also claimed to 
provide a glimpse at everyday life, “How a Soviet family lives: the home, healthcare, education 
and leisure.”44  
Initially, the next Soviet Exhibition of Science, Technology, and Culture after Mexico 
City was Sri Lanka, and that exhibition was to open in late 1960, but recent developments in 
Cuban-Soviet relations led to a change of plans. When Aleksander Alekseev, a KGB operative 
assigned to observing the Cuban Revolution, met with Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro on 
October 16, 1959, Castro suggested that the exhibition set to take place in Mexico City should 
also make its way to Havana. After consuming a meal of fine Soviet caviar and vodka provided 
by Alekseev, Castro bluntly summed up the goals of Soviet public diplomacy: 
                                                          
43 “SSSR i Meksiko,” Novoe Vremia, no. 48, 1959: 2-3. 
 
44 Advertisement, Excélsior, 17 Nov. 1959: 15. 
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You know what Lenin said, “In order to bring any kind of idea to life, you have to 
fling it to the masses.” You suggest a slogan to the masses, and the masses should 
become possessed of it. So now we will spread the slogan “Friendship with the 
Soviet Union!” and when the public begins to feel that this is necessary, we will 
reestablish relations.45 
 
Despite the ad hoc nature of the request, the Soviet side agreed. However, it played coy by 
refusing to acknowledge this agreement publicly, officially announcing the impending exhibition 
in Havana only a week before its opening.46 This forced the exhibition’s staff of 90 specialists to 
quickly enlist the aid of 280 Cuban workers in the assembly of 700,000 kilograms of materials in 
that short time.47 
The Soviet Exhibition of Science, Technology and Culture it occupied the Palacio de 
Bellas Artes in the heart of Havana, which traditionally housed collections of Cuban art. The 
new venue afforded the Soviet exhibition an extra 1,000 square meters of space, and thus the 
opportunity to add more new displays.48 The Havana exhibition ran for three weeks in early 
1960, from February 5 to February 25.49 
Unlike its Mexican and Cuban predecessors, the Brazilian exhibition in 1962 was not an 
offshoot of any other major Soviet showcase. Soviet experience from the exhibitions in New 
York, Mexico City, and Havana informed its development. In the Soviet press during this period, 
Brazil received more coverage than any other Latin American country besides Cuba. Its immense 
size, population, and resource base attracted analysis by many of the USSR’s new Latin 
American specialists, whose numbers began to grow following the foundation of the Latin 
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American Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1961.50 The Soviet Exhibition of 
Science, Technology and Culture in Rio de Janeiro covered 18,000 square meters of space inside 
the Palácio de São Cristóvão, also known as the Palácio Imperial, which once housed the 
Brazilian royal family and now served as the national museum of Brazil.51 The Brazilian 
exhibition lasted from May 3 to June 3.52  
Accessible pricing represented a new strategy for attracting visitors that contrasted with 
previous Soviet cultural events hosted in Latin America. Performances by Soviet theatre and 
musical groups in Latin America, as well as screenings of Soviet films, typically had served as a 
means of obtaining hard currency through ticket sales. This policy had aroused complaints from 
Soviet embassies and the SSOD, who noted that the US hosted cheap concerts and 
complimentary film and literature festivals that reached wide audiences.53 The Soviet organizers 
had decided to forgo monetary gain in order to reach attract more ordinary Latin Americans in a 
conscious effort to emulate the US’s cultural diplomacy. Admission to each exhibition cost one 
peso, around eight cents in US currency at the time, and students accompanied by teachers could 
get in free.54 A major priority of these exhibitions, attracting schoolchildren reflected a broader 
Soviet concern with education in Latin America that was developing during this time.55  
Given the immense turnout for these events, the number of Soviet guides tasked with 
aiding visitors was quite low. At the Havana display only ninety guides were available to assist 
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attendees.56 The lack of fluent Soviet Spanish speakers probably caused this deficit. Many of the 
Soviet guides at the Mexican and Cuban exhibitions were orphans from the Spanish Civil War 
who were evacuated to the USSR in the 1930s and grew up to become translators.57 After the 
exhibitions closed, the Soviet press published firsthand accounts from guides retelling stories of 
enthusiastic Latin American visitors enraptured by Soviet science and culture. According to one 
guide’s recollection of the Rio exhibition, published on September 7, 1962, to coincide with 
Brazilian Independence Day, 
Once, a middle aged man came [to me]. . . . He briefly talked about himself: he was a 
captain in the [Brazilian] Air Force . . . on the day when Yuri Gagarin flew over Brazil in 
his space ship, Captain da Silva’s son was born. As a sign of respect and love for the 
Soviet people and the Soviet Union, he called his son Yuri Gagarin Segunda do Silva. 
When Gagarin visited Brazil, he met his namesake, and agreed to become the child’s 
godfather.58 
 
Regardless of its veracity, this was the kind of story about Latin Americans the Soviet media 
wanted to circulate, an example of heartfelt admiration for Soviet accomplishment. The Brazilian 
Air Force captain is reduced to the role of captivated onlooker while Gagarin demonstrates 
Soviet exceptionalism to the whole world. Stunned by this example of Soviet scientific mastery–
nonviolent but still an assertion of dominance–the captain names his own son after Gagarin. The 
good-natured Gagarin then agrees to become the child’s godfather, evidence of the USSR’s 
unreserved embrace of its new foreign friends. This vignette reveals how Latin American 
appreciation of Soviet technological and scientific achievement cemented the USSR’s new 
image as benevolent superpower intent on aiding the developing world.  
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Important Soviet officials opened each of the three exhibitions. Anastas Mikoian, dubbed 
“Russia’s busiest traveling salesman” by the US press, flew to Mexico City and Havana to open 
the first two exhibitions.59 Mikoian served as the USSR’s foreign trade minister from 1938 to 
1949, and is considered a major proponent of the Khrushchev regime’s more open and inviting 
foreign policy.60 Large crowds greeted him at both airports, comprising local workers bused in 
for the occasion.61 In Mexico City the crowds greeted Mikoian with a mixture of Spanish and 
Russian cries of “Viva Mikoian,” “Rusia – khorosho,” and “Druzhba!” The Mexican Senate 
granted Mikoian an audience, an honor which, according to Soviet sources, was “not frequently 
offered to foreign visitors.”62 
With his speech to the Senate, Mikoian created something of an incident. While the 
organizers of the Mexican exhibition consciously deemphasized Soviet ideology and competition 
with the West, Mikoian–an Old Bolshevik with a communist pedigree dating back to the October 
Revolution–openly criticized Mexico’s northern neighbor.63 Congratulating the Mexican 
politicians as fellow revolutionaries fighting the struggle against imperialism, he declared 
himself a member of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Mexico’s dominant political party, 
due to the similarities he presumed between its outlook and that of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. According to Mikoian, Khrushchev’s commitment to peace was a direct 
consequence of his country’s Leninist heritage and ideology. 
The state’s first decree after the October Revolution, drafted by V. I Lenin, 
founder of our party and the Soviet state, was a decree about peace appealing to 
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all countries to put an end to war and establish peace. . . . This call, however, fell 
on deaf ears. . . . Now N. S. Khrushchev has brought before the UN General 
Assembly a new, expanded proposal for general and complete disarmament, 
which attracted the attention of the entire world. . . . Compare the first decree 
about peace, written by Lenin forty-two years ago, and Khrushchev’s proposals 
and you will see that over the entire period the Soviet Union has lead the struggle 
for peace and general disarmament.64 
 
These faux pas split the Mexican press’ response, occasionally even within the same paper, 
between praise for the Soviet exhibition, with its technical marvels and nonthreatening tone, and 
condemnation of Mikoian’s imprudent and inflammatory remarks. One piece in Excélsior, a 
paper which otherwise praised the Soviet exhibition, remarked, “It might be said that Mr. 
Mikoian came to Mexico, not to inaugurate the Soviet exhibition . . . but rather to attack our 
neighbors to the north, with the intent of prejudicing us against them.”65 
Mikoian also created controversy in Cuba on the opening day of the Havana exhibition. 
After an introduction by the Cuban Minister of Commerce Raúl Cepero Bonilla, Mikoian gave a 
public speech about the Soviet-Cuban partnership’s struggle against imperialism and the 
connection between the revolutionary heritage of Cuba and the USSR. “Indeed, while surveying 
the exhibition, vividly imagine all the great historical significance of the October Revolution for 
the destiny of mankind.”66 Mikoian then laid a ceremonial wreath on a statue of José Martí, 
Cuba’s national poet. In response, a group of local students and priests tore the wreath off the 
statue and began an anti-Soviet protest. Cuban police put a stop to the demonstration, arresting 
nineteen of the students.67  
                                                          
64 “A. I. Mikoian v Meksike.” 
 
65 “Mikoyan [sic] Atacó a EE.UU., y se Declaró Miembro del PRI.” 
 
66 “Vse slyshnee golos narodov, prizyvaiushikh k miru,” Pravda, 7 Feb. 1960. 
 
67 “Diecinueve Estudiantes Cubanos Detenidos,” ABC Sevilla, 7 Feb. 1960. 
 22 
 
Perhaps due to fear of another such incident, the USSR dispatched Minister of Foreign 
Trade Nikolai Patolichev to open the Brazilian exhibition. In spite of President Goulart’s new 
policy of friendly engagement with the USSR, many Brazilian politicians remained strongly 
anticommunist, so Patolichev made sure to keep his rhetoric light and humorous and to 
deemphasize ideology and underscore the practical benefits of closer Soviet-Brazilian relations. 
“As is frequently the case in relations between countries with differing social systems, 
resumption of Brazilian-Soviet contacts begins with the resumption of trade ties–thriving 
international trade makes for peace and friendship.”68 On the opening day of the exhibition, 
Patolichev signed a trade contract with the fervent anticommunist Carlos Lacerda, the governor 
of the state of Guanabara and one of the leading opponents of Goulart and the Brazilian Left.69  
Appearing on Brazilian television, Patolichev adeptly maintained a casual, jocular tone. When 
asked about his expectations regarding the forthcoming World Cup in Chile, Patolichev replied, 
“I wish the Brazilian team every success and the Soviet team victory.”70 
Regardless of the personalities of the men responsible for opening these events, the 
Soviet Exhibitions of Science, Culture, and Technology epitomized the optimism and inclusivity 
that characterized Soviet diplomacy in the Khrushchev era. They served two important functions. 
At the most basic level, they promoted closer trade relations between Latin America and the 
Soviet Union by showcasing what products and machinery the USSR could offer. At the time, 
the Soviet press, including the growing number of newspapers and magazines translated for 
foreign consumption, espoused a new Soviet commitment to building mutually beneficial 
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international trade networks for the purpose of promoting world peace, and these exhibitions 
reflected this discursive shift.71  More importantly, they also increased Soviet influence and soft 
power in the region by legitimizing the USSR as a modern, developed nation capable of serving 
as a role model for Latin America. By reflecting the liberalizing and modernizing trends of the 
Khrushchev era, these exhibitions rebranded the Soviet Union while magnifying its prestige. 
At a lunch meeting with the National Association of Mexican Importers and Exporters, 
Mikoian stated that the primary goal of the exhibitions was to “remove the sediment of the Cold 
War”72 that obscured Latin America’s understanding of the Soviet Union. “[Visitors will] 
acquire a closer knowledge of Soviet life, better understand the interests and aspirations of the 
Soviet people, and form a more comprehensive picture of Soviet achievements.”73 At the time, 
US propaganda asserted that the USSR sought to promote violent revolutions. Adolf Berle, head 
of the Kennedy administration’s interdepartmental task force on Latin American affairs, insisted 
in public lectures that “Leninist dogma requires communists to believe that no other kind of 
revolution is worth having.”74 The Soviet Exhibitions of Science, Technology, and Culture 
countered this rhetoric by demonstrating the Soviet commitment to peace, trade, and 
cooperation. Exhibits with titles such as “Nuclear Energy in the Service of Peace” demonstrated 
the USSR’s commitment to use its scientific achievements responsibly, while commercial stalls 
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and trade experts at the events worked to sell all types of Soviet products, from industrial 
machinery to kitchen appliances, to interested visitors who could afford them.75  
American depictions of Soviet poverty and backwardness presented additional obstacles 
that needed to be overcome. Thus, it was important to show that Soviet technological and 
economic achievements had improved the lives of ordinary Soviet citizens. Soviet press articles, 
featuring quotations from exhibition guest books and conversations with guides, quoted 
testimonials wherein visitors described how, after the viewing exhibitions, they “now see the 
world differently,” and believe in the Soviet “policy of peace and friendship.”76 For example, 
“this exhibition shows what can be achieved by people unified in their desire to fight for 
prosperity and peace in the whole world. I wish that soon all the nations united for the benefit of 
humanity. Peace and friendship!” Oftentimes these pieces would not mention the names of the 
people who left these notes, ascribing statements such as this to an “ordinary Mexican.”77 
 The USSR hoped to supplant the US and Europe as the model of development toward 
which Third World nations strove, and this logic motivated efforts to prove the superiority of 
Soviet-style modernization. From its foundation, the USSR portrayed itself as a rapidly 
modernizing state that would lead the world into the future. Now that the Soviet Union was a 
superpower in a rapidly decolonizing world, however, the exhibits served to educate developing 
nations “to open their eyes to the reality” of the Soviet success story, “to help lift the veil of false 
propaganda that was thrown over them.”78 While still maintaining its rhetorical commitment to 
social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth, the official Soviet discourse on modernity 
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underwent radical changes during the Khrushchev period. The most notable new development 
was a growing emphasis on both Soviet scientific achievement and socialist consumerism. The 
content of the exhibitions reflected these new developments, as I will show in the next two 
sections. 
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Science and Technology 
 
The launch of Sputnik in 1957 heralded a new era in which the USSR could credibly 
claim world leadership in science. Combined with achievements in the peaceful use of nuclear 
power, this early Soviet lead in the space race stunned Latin American observers, with some 
even recalling this event as the first time they ever heard of the Soviet Union.79 The Soviet 
Exhibitions of Science, Technology, and Culture capitalized on this by displaying Soviet 
technology’s most cutting-edge innovations as a means of generating both enthusiastic interest in 
and awestruck respect for the Soviet Union. At the same time, displays of Soviet technology 
reaffirmed the traditional Soviet fixation on mastering the forces of nature. They defined Soviet 
power in terms of the USSR’s ability to overcome environmental, human, and even terrestrial 
boundaries. 
Spaceflight was a major theme of all three exhibitions. Nothing else confirmed that the 
USSR could make the impossible possible quite like the successes of the Soviet space program. 
In conjunction with the opening of the Mexican exhibition, the Soviet international weekly 
Novoe vremia published a political cartoon showing a Mexican family, clothed in ponchos and 
sombreros, looking up in the sky at a Soviet Lunik capsule and exclaiming “and just think, all 
this has been done by a country that used to be underdeveloped!”80 At the Mexican and Cuban 
exhibitions, a photo of the dark side of the moon, an absolute novelty for the time, featured 
prominently. The other main attractions, one genuine Lunik and three models of the Sputnik 
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spacecraft suspended above onlookers, also drew immense attention.81 One particularly fanciful 
display, “a marble model of Moscow University suspended symbolically against the heavens,” 
invited young exhibition goers to apply to this prestigious university.82 The Brazilian exhibition 
housed the Vostok 1 and Vostok 2 spacecraft and models of various moons, as well as 
photographs and posters of Yuri Gagarin, billed as “the Columbus of the Cosmos.”83  
Other displays echoed the theme of Soviet exceptionalism with examples of Soviet 
mastery over nature that produced more practical benefits for ordinary citizens. The Nuclear 
Energy in the Service of Peace section of the Mexican and Cuban exhibitions included a scale 
model of the Soviet ship Lenin, the world’s first nuclear-powered icebreaker, which exhibition 
goers could freely touch.84 Sections on energy production in the USSR at each exhibition housed 
elaborate scale models of hydroelectric dams. At the Mexican and Cuban exhibitions, the 
Stalinist era Dneprostroi dam made an appearance, while the more ambitious Bratsk 
hydroelectric dam in Siberia, still undergoing construction but set to become the world’s single 
biggest power producer, featured prominently in Rio. 85  Other modes of power generation, 
including early atomic and solar power, also wowed guests. The Brazilian exhibition 
demonstrated the potential uses of some of the earliest solar batteries.86 The USSR took a keen 
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interest in the possibility of aiding Latin American nations with electric power generation and 
securing contracts to build hydroelectric dams and atomic power plants in the region.87  
 The USSR likewise suggested it could aid Latin America by supplying the latest in 
medical technology. At the Cuban exhibition, visitors could look through a UV microscope to 
observe various samples of microorganisms. One noteworthy display demonstrated a machine 
that could sew up a patient’s artery in seconds. The Cuban exhibition featured film projections of 
experiments on live animals.88 Soviet biological and medical science also got their own displays 
at the Brazilian exhibition, where the Foreign Trade Ministry made samples of Soviet surgical 
and optical equipment available for viewing and purchase by Latin American medical 
professionals.89  
 Both the public and the press response to Soviet science and industry at the exhibitions 
was the most uniformly positive reaction these events inspired. Many of the positive responses 
left in guestbooks focused on this theme. “Although I don’t share your ideology, congratulations 
to you for your economic and technical developments!”90 Even the more conservative papers 
Excélsior and Bohemia noted the USSR’s impressive ability to overcome and master its natural 
surroundings, setting an example for the economically underdeveloped but resource rich 
countries of Latin America. “[The exhibition provides] a practical demonstration of how the 
Soviet Union was able to direct human effort and thought to the creation of an abundance of 
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material values. . . . We should learn from Soviet achievement."91  Notably, when picking 
citations from Latin American press sources to spotlight the enthusiasm the exhibitions 
generated, Soviet papers almost always chose descriptions of Soviet technical marvels because 
they so closely aligned with the intended message of those displays. For example, a piece in the 
Soviet newspaper Pravda (Truth) quoted an article in the Mexican paper Siempre, in which 
journalist Antonio Rodrigues affirmed that he now understood that the USSR was a developed 
nation. According to him, despite American propaganda that “denied that these peoples were 
capable of producing anything but bread and beets, saying that the Soviet Union cannot take the 
path of modern science and technology,” the Mexican people knew “where the truth is and where 
the lies are” thanks to the Soviet exhibition.92  
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Consumer Goods 
 
 Promoting Soviet consumerism during his time in power, Khrushchev stated that this was 
important “not only to provide people with good homes, but also to teach them . . . to live 
correctly.”93 A high standard of living would inculcate desired manners and virtues in order to 
speed the USSR’s transition to communism. This resulted in changes to the official discourse, as 
homes stocked with a plentiful assortment of appliances and domestic comforts became an 
essential part of the new image of Soviet progress. For this reason, the Soviet press detailed long 
lists of the products on display at the exhibitions. For instance, one article about the exhibition in 
Rio mentioned “watches, motorcycles, bicycles, household electronics, radios, televisions, 
cameras, tableware, crystal, carpets, furs, shoes, musical instruments” alongside lists of industrial 
machinery and technological displays featured at that event.94 While many of these items 
remained inaccessible to ordinary Soviet citizens, the decision to include lists like this in almost 
all reports echoed the abiding optimism of Soviet public discourse in the Khrushchev era. To that 
end, sections displaying a model Soviet home and the “Well-Being of the Soviet Man” presented 
visitors with a wide array of consumer luxuries supposedly available in the USSR. According to 
the American press, however, the model Soviet home inspired disbelief because it was so well-
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appointed. In one anecdotal account, a group of Mexicans remarked, “We didn’t know Soviet 
workers lived so well,” to which a Soviet guide replied “Neither did I.”95  
 When describing the reasons for the Havana exhibition on its opening day, Minister of 
Commerce Bonilla explained, “Cubans don’t consume Soviet goods. Cubans don’t know about 
Soviet progress and science besides atomic missiles and space rockets. Here we will learn how 
Soviet citizens live.”96 In Cuba, the Latin American country with more televisions per capita than 
any other,97 the Soviet exhibition demonstrated the sophistication of broadcast technology in the 
USSR. Displays assured visitors that the USSR’s million television owning households had 
plenty of programming from which to choose.98 At the exhibition’s shops, Cuban visitors could 
purchase Soviet televisions as well as the same caviar and vodka with which the KGB had plied 
Castro. Demand for Soviet watches at the Havana exhibition overwhelmed the event’s organizers. 
According to one account, Cubans purchased “books, magazines, stamps, cigarette cases, canned 
food, vodka; but what really attracts Cubans is the watches. How many have been sold? 
Thousands. And thousands more will be sold until none are left.”99 
 The Brazilian exhibition offered an even greater variety of Soviet goods for viewing and 
purchase: fine furs, motorcycles, crystal dinnerware, carpets, and musical instruments, as well as 
the latest fashions in Soviet clothing and footwear.100 The exhibition hosted a fashion show, 
where young Soviet women modeled short skirts and other trendy outfits. A similar event 
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occurred during the New York exhibition three years prior, prompting Latin American reporters 
to favorably compare the beauty and grace of the Russian women to the “scrawny Western 
models.”101 Such a favorable response likely motivated the show in Rio. 
 While the overall reception of the consumer-oriented displays from Latin American 
audiences was mixed, in a few instances they provoked open hostility. An article published in 
Bohemia reminded Cuban readers of “what they [the USSR] did not bring to the Soviet 
exhibition” in Havana.102 In contrast to the photos of excited crowds gathered around Soviet 
displays published in many Latin American magazines and papers, including Bohemia itself, this 
article showed dismal pictures of dilapidated housing and empty shops found in the Eastern Bloc. 
The piece warns readers not to admire Soviet socialism simply because it put a man in space. 
Furthermore, in an ironic homage to the stickers plastered around Mexico City advertising the 
exhibition there, some visitors took it upon themselves to place signs at the various commercial 
displays that read, “this product was made with slave labor.”103 It seems that, despite a broad 
consensus in Latin American society that held Soviet scientific achievement in high regard, there 
were still many who refused to believe that the USSR had become a land of abundant consumer 
plenty. 
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Fine Arts and Cultural Performance 
 
 While the focus on technology and material culture in many of the displays highlighted 
the importance of the concepts in defining the USSR, more traditional forms of cultural 
performance also played a role in showcasing the Soviet Union in Latin America. During the 
Khrushchev period, the USSR sought to take part in the increasing globalization of world culture. 
In doing so, it pursued two distinct strategies that had their roots in the Stalinist culture of the 
1930s. One of these strategies aimed to overcome the influence of US pop culture by catering to 
more refined sensibilities. The old Soviet fixation on kul’turnost, on the ability of high culture 
such as opera and ballet to elevate the sensibilities of the masses, appealed greatly to Latin 
American elites who had grown increasingly wary of the impact American cultural forms had on 
their youth.104 According to the Chilean communist Julieta Campusano 
Those who we call the Coca-Cola generation wear t-shirts, dance rock n’ roll, 
chew gum and imitate everything from the Yankees. . . . They are victims of the 
corrosive impact of US films and those hideous North American criminal 
novels. . . . Our intellectuals, however, still know the Russian authors of the past. 
We follow the political life, the scientific discoveries and cultural achievements of 
the Soviet Union.105 
  
At the same time, the Stalinist concept of “friendship of the peoples” found its second wind as 
the USSR discovered the Global South. By mutually appreciating each other’s distinct national 
folklore and traditions, Soviet cultural officials stressed that both the USSR and Latin America 
would be able to develop their own cultures on their own terms. As they put it, only “truly 
national art, flamingly patriotic, helps prevent the blind mimicry of decadent foreign [Western] 
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models.”106 Taken together, this emphasis on exchanges of both folk and high culture constituted 
an alternative mode of cultural globalization intended to appeal to both nationalist and elitist 
sensibilities.  
Veteran Soviet musicians and dancers made their way to the exhibitions to demonstrate 
the magnificence of Soviet culture. Shostakovich and Khachaturian sold out concerts held in 
conjunction with the Mexican and Cuban exhibitions, with prominent political leaders such as 
López Mateos and Fidel Castro in attendance.107 Dancers from the Bolshoi Theatre performed in 
order to promote the Mexican exhibition. At the Brazilian exhibition, the celebrated Berezka 
ensemble performed Russian folk dances before touring the rest of Latin America.108  
Soviet cinema and literature also played an important role in justifying Soviet claims to 
cultural superiority. Khrushchev had encouraged Soviet filmmakers to produce movies that 
excelled in their “artistic power and execution,” with an eye toward competition with Western 
films.109 This policy paid off when Mikhail Kalatozov’s The Cranes are Flying won the Palme 
d’Or at Cannes, and Soviet cinema became a major component of Soviet cultural outreach. Each 
of the exhibitions housed its own small movie theatre, with twenty projection rooms showing a 
continuous run of Soviet documentary and feature films.110 Mirroring the example of previous 
American literature festivals in the region, the exhibition in Mexico City offered a reading room 
stocked with Soviet and Russian literary classics, and copies of some books, as well as the Soviet 
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Constitution, were available for purchase.111 The USSR even donated a large collection of Soviet 
literature to the Havana library system on the opening day of the Cuban exhibition.112  
Not all of the Soviet cultural products on display, however, provoked positive responses. 
Stalls at all three exhibitions featured Soviet oil paintings and sculpture. While photos of 
impressive works of Soviet sculpture made their way into Latin American magazine articles 
about the exhibits, Soviet paintings are noticeably absent. Criticism of Soviet painting appeared 
even in the leftwing Mexican journal Siempre, which unfavorably compared the Socialist Realist 
works on display with the Modernist style of native communist painter Diego Rivera and asked 
“Is this socialism? . . . There is no socialism where you cannot produce art.”113 
Some even reacted violently to the Soviet cultural attractions at these events. On the 
evening of May 20, an anonymous tip warned Brazilian authorities about a bomb planted in the 
Soviet exhibition. They then forced visitors to evacuate the exhibition for two days until they 
located the homemade explosive, comprised of twelve sticks of dynamite attached to a clock 
timer, found in one of the projection rooms.114 The bomber intended to blow up the whole Soviet 
movie theater as well as presumably any Brazilians interested in Soviet film. Jose Chaves 
Lameirão, a retired officer with a history of psychiatric issues, confessed to the crime. After this 
incident, local Brazilian authorities stepped up security. While the US press stressed that the 
mentally unstable Lameirão acted alone, the Soviet media drew a connection between his actions 
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and those of a mysterious cabal of anti-Soviet forces.115 These subversives supposedly opposed 
both closer ties between the USSR and Brazil as well as the leftwing policies of the Goulart 
presidency. Pravda repeated a claim made in the Brazilian paper Gazeta de Notícias (Gazette of 
News) that agents sent by Carlos Lacerda had actually carried out the attack.116 Simultaneously, 
the Soviet press also insisted that Goulart himself had no knowledge of this plot and that, “in 
Brazil the government and the general public condemn the actions of enemies of friendship 
between Brazil and the USSR.”117 
The Soviet press also spotlighted much more positive responses to these exhibitions from 
Latin American audiences. One engrossing article in Pravda featured a letter from a Mexican 
professor named Ramon Carranza who came to love Soviet films and novels after encountering 
them at the Soviet exhibition. He purportedly wrote, “why has there been such sudden interest in 
Mexico about Soviet culture and life in the Soviet Union? In the capital of our country a recent 
event took place that was very important for the friendship between our peoples. The event–the 
Soviet exhibition in Mexico.”118 Proclaiming his newfound belief that the USSR is a mighty 
nation devoted to peace and mutual cooperation with the entire world, Carranza responded to his 
encounter with Soviet culture by learning Russian in order to engage more fully with it and teach 
students how to do the same, thereby breaking the barriers that inhibit closer cooperation with 
the USSR. The media thus presented Soviet audiences with the notion that their language was 
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becoming more popular worldwide, and that ordinary Latin Americans were motivated to study 
Russian because of their fascination with Russian culture and achievements.119 
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Outcomes 
 
In many ways, the Soviet exhibition in Havana set the stage for the close Soviet-Cuban 
partnership that lasted until the collapse of the USSR. Before the Soviet exhibition, the 
administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-61) negotiated with the revolutionary 
regime to insure that Cuba would remain a US ally and that American businesses on the island 
would not be nationalized. The new Cuban government had no formal diplomatic relations with 
the USSR, and the Soviet press barely mentioned the Cuban revolution.120 After the Soviet 
Union hosted the exhibition in Havana, the fervently anticommunist Eisenhower administration 
drastically cut US imports of Cuban sugar, expecting this to create an economic crisis on the 
island. Instead, the USSR stepped in to purchase the unsold sugar and extended generous offers 
of credits and Soviet technicians to the island. Soviet national and local papers began printing 
articles about Cuba and its heroic struggle. Cuba quickly became a cultural phenomenon in the 
USSR, and Castro declared himself a Marxist-Leninist.121 Some historians argue that the Soviet 
exhibition in Havana set off this chain of events.122  
Thankfully, since the exhibition in Havana was held before the advent of censorship on 
the island, diversity of opinion can be found in the reactions of the Cuban press to the Soviet 
displays. Both Bohemia, an older publication known to speak for Cuba’s left-leaning middle 
class, and INRA, the official magazine of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform and a 
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mouthpiece for the Cuban government, featured extensive coverage of the events. INRA 
maintained a consistently positive tone, even going so far as to parrot Soviet claims to having 
invented the radio and the airplane.123 In contrast, Bohemia consciously measured the Soviet 
achievements on display against the history of Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe, particularly 
Hungary, and advocated taking claims that Soviet citizens experienced consumer plenty with 
grain of salt.124 
The exhibition in Brazil fostered very different results. The Goulart presidency, which 
endured ceaseless criticism for its leftism, faced accusations that commercial and diplomatic 
connections with the USSR created a conduit for communist infiltration and subversion.125 
Nonetheless, this policy paid major dividends–trade deals signed during the exhibition raised the 
total value of Brazilian-Soviet trade from $42 million to $140 million.126 Goulart possessed even 
grander ambitions, stating in an interview with Pravda that “although trade with the Soviet 
Union has so far been carried out very effectively, I believe that it will expand even more after 
Brazil takes measures to initiate trade with all the countries of the socialist bloc.”127 After the 
exhibition, Goulart proposed traveling to Moscow to open a Brazilian exhibition there. He did 
not get that chance. The decision to allow a Soviet exhibition into the country greatly upset the 
US, given the Cuban example.128 In 1964, the US worked with rightist elements in the Brazilian 
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military to oust Goulart in a coup d’état, motivated in large part by fears of communist influence 
over the Brazilian government.129 The exhibition succeeded, however, in convincing even the 
most conservative Brazilians that the USSR had much to offer as a trading partner. From 1965, 
the economist Roberto Campos presided over the newly established Brazilian Ministry for 
Economic Planning and Coordination. His first foreign trip as representative of the 
anticommunist military junta took him to the Soviet Union, where he was received with all 
honors and showed around the USSR for a week.130 Campos had no sympathies for Soviet 
socialism but pragmatically saw the advantages of trade and collaboration. As a result, Brazil 
became a major commercial partner of the USSR. In 1972 a Soviet trade fair opened in São 
Paulo, and Brazilians hosted their own expo in Moscow in 1974, fulfilling Goulart’s ambition 
despite his exile.131 
Mexico experienced the least noteworthy outcome from its encounter with “the Soviet 
Union in miniature,” at least in the short term. While a small minority protested the exhibition in 
Mexico City, the USSR was not a total newcomer to Mexico and most people took little 
consideration of any imagined communist threat. At the same time, moreover, commercial 
possibilities remained limited because Mexico and the USSR possessed incompatible export 
profiles, as both nations primarily exported hydrocarbons and manufactured goods and imported 
agricultural products.132 Reactions to the exhibitions in the Mexican press were mixed, with both 
right- and left-leaning publications praising some elements while criticizing others. Both the 
conservative Excélsior and the socialist Siempre praised the Soviet technical achievements on 
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display, but the former took issue with Mikoyan’s visit and speech to the Mexican Senate while 
the latter criticized the displays of banal socialist realist paintings.133 The threat of Castroist 
subversion provoked by the Cuban regime’s turn toward Marxist-Leninism, however, helped to 
discredit the leftist Mateos. After his presidential term ended in 1964, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party–Mateo’s party and the dominant political party in Mexico–became more 
politically conservative. 
The year 1964 saw the decline of one more politician involved in these exhibitions. 
Concerns provoked by the Cuban Missile Crisis helped motivate Khrushchev’s own comrades to 
remove him from power. The Soviet exhibitions themselves cost tremendous amounts of money 
while the expanded trade generated little overall benefit for the Soviet economy. As 
Khrushchev’s fellow Presidium member Dmitri Polianskii explained, “Comrade Khrushchev was 
pleased to announce that Stalin had not succeeded in penetrating Latin America whereas he had. 
First, the policy of penetrating Latin America had not been our policy. And second, this meant 
that our country had to commit itself to providing military supplies an ocean away, 15,000 
kilometers.”134 The Soviet leadership did not abandon Khrushchev’s policy of commercial and 
diplomatic engagement with Latin America, however, and the new General Secretary Leonid 
Brezhnev (1964-82) would end up further strengthening Soviet ties to the region. In 1974, 
Brezhnev made a well-publicized trip to Cuba, becoming the first Soviet head of state to visit 
Latin America. Argentina and Brazil became major Soviet trading partners. When US President 
Jimmy Carter (1977-81) imposed an embargo on American grain shipments to the USSR, 
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Argentina and Brazil agreed to make up the difference with their own grain exports, rendering 
Carter’s policy ineffectual.135  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
135 Prizel, Latin America through Soviet Eyes, 35. 
 
 43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Given that the Soviet exhibition in Rio dwarfed its exhibition in New York, it could be 
argued that the USSR worked even harder to promote its message of peace and development to 
Latin American audiences than to US ones. The Soviet Exhibitions of Science, Technology, and 
Culture presented a Soviet self-image that was distinct to the forward-thinking Khrushchev era 
but also harkened back to past experience with modernization in the USSR’s non-European 
republics. The exhibitions’ showcasing of soaring scientific achievements sought to inspire awe 
and dispel myths of Soviet backwardness, while displays of consumer goods offered a vision of 
Soviet life that would seem familiar to middle- and upper-class Latin Americans. The US press 
might have dismissed the scope of these exhibitions as being limited to “Sputniks and rockets 
and economic progress under the seven-year plan,”136 but the event organizers hoped to 
emphasize Soviet cultural sophistication as well.  
 The USSR faced many obstacles as it attempted to engage Latin American audiences at 
events such as these. In the years before the exhibitions, the US had gone to great lengths to 
prove that its model of development was the only path to prosperity and that the Soviet example 
would lead developing nations astray from true modernization. The launch of Sputnik in 1957, 
however, coupled with a rising wave of anti-US sentiment in the region opened a window of 
opportunity for the USSR to present its society and its successes on its own terms. Depictions of 
foreigners marveling at the USSR’s achievements served to strengthen its image domestically. 
The Soviet press was keen to show that Latin American audiences no longer thought the USSR 
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could produce only bread and beets and instead believed that they could learn from the Soviet 
example.  
In their attempt to cater to audiences in developing countries, these exhibits employed 
several tropes familiar to the Soviet experience of modernization in the 1930s. The exhibitions 
depicted the Soviet system as one capable of overcoming impossible obstacles and mastering 
natural forces. Cultural displays and performances utilized both high culture and folk culture to 
demonstrate the Soviet commitment to cultivating true art in opposition to Western pop culture. 
In the face of Western claims that the USSR was not a developed country and that average 
Soviet citizens lived in poverty, the Soviet exhibitions presented Soviet socialism as a model of 
development that encouraged both extensive resource development and domestic consumerism.  
Responses to these exhibitions in the Latin American press ranged from glowing praise to 
critical skepticism. The USSR now enjoyed wider recognition from Latin Americans as an 
example of quick and effective modernization in a poor country, yet Soviet ideology and the 
Soviet way of life remained inimical to most. In some instances, the Soviet appeal fell on deaf 
ears, yet the USSR saw anti-Soviet sentiment as the residue of Cold War propaganda that would 
be washed away as the USSR and Latin America developed closer relations.  
The Soviet cultural offensive achieved a turnabout in Soviet-Latin American relations. 
By showcasing the USSR as a credible ally and trading partner, the exhibitions in Brazil and 
Cuba jumpstarted the development of friendly relationships that would eventually evolve into 
major bilateral agreements. There remained much that needed to be done, however, before the 
USSR could hope to become a major influence on Latin American politics, trade, and culture. 
The popularity of the exhibitions aroused the ire of the US, which in 1964 demonstrated its 
willingness to use violence as a means of asserting control in the region. And while Brezhnev 
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would continue Khrushchev’s policy of economic engagement with Latin America, he did not 
share his predecessor’s belief that establishing crosscultural connections with nonsocialist 
countries represented a viable means of promoting peace.137 Therefore, the Soviet exhibitions in 
Latin America could be considered both major milestones in the USSR’s developing relationship 
with the region as well as unique products of the idealistic period of Soviet history in which they 
were conceived. 
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